The Mind-Body Dualism of HBO’s ‘Westworld’
“But what then am I? A thing which thinks.” — Rene Descartes
Virtually every story about androids relies on the idea of mind-body dualism to some extent, but few have illustrated it so clearly as HBO’s Westworld.
Now in its third season, the series portrays a group of androids called Hosts who are programmed to entertain guests at a realistic theme park called Westworld. Over time, the Hosts gradually gain consciousness and free will, and finally, rebel against their human controllers to gain freedom.
This pattern of the runaway, out-of-control robot is nothing new, nor is the concept of an android with a synthetic humanoid body with an artificially intelligent mind. What makes Westworld stand out is its depiction of the type of substance dualism similar to that imagined by French philosopher Rene Descartes.
The Mind as ‘Pilot in a Vessel’
Aside from his contributions to mathematics, Descartes is probably best known today for saying, “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum, in Latin), which has been widely repeated, parodied, and made into memes. He made a statement something like that (depending on the translation) in his book Meditations on First Philosophy, published in 1641. The phrase roughly sums up Descartes’ idea that thinking (the action of the mind) is the only proof of his existence. Everything else — his body, his surroundings, the world in general — could be an illusion, a dream, or his imagination. There is no way to tell for sure.
Descartes’ reasoning also led him to conclude that the mind and body were separate substances. He believed the body to be a physical substance, with form, shape, dimension, and motion. He also envisioned the mind as a substance, “an intelligent substance”[1] comprised the consciousness, the self (often referred to as the Cogito), and the immortal soul. Descartes believed that although the mind and body behave concert as they interact with the world, they are ultimately separate. He wrote, “That I [meaning, the Cogito] am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it.”[2]
Descartes even identified a specific space in the body where the mind is located: the pineal gland, situated deep within the brain. In The Passions of the Soul, Descartes wrote:
“The part of the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is not the heart at all, or the whole of the brain. It is rather the innermost part of the brain, which is a certain very small gland situated in the middle of the brain’s substance and suspended above the passage through which the spirits in the brain’s anterior cavities communicate with those in its posterior cavities. The slightest movements on the part of this gland may alter very greatly the course of these spirits, and conversely any change, however slight, taking place in the course of the spirits may do much to change the movements of the gland.”[3]
In Descartes’ view, the body is a machine,[4] operated by the mind-substance of the Cogito, located deep within the brain. Sound familiar? It should, if you’re a viewer of Westworld, because the series portrays an almost identical set-up in its android Hosts.
Pearls of the Cogito
Like most science fiction stories, Westworld has provided only sketchy details explaining how the Hosts are made. In short, fleeting scenes, we see the bodies in various stages of being created, 3-D printed while spread eagle within hoops, like DaVinci’s Vitruvian man. They are sometimes shown with wires and circuitry, but they bleed when shot or cut, as if they’re organic. We presume their bodies and skin are soft and supple enough to satisfy the guests who use them for sex.
The “minds” of the Hosts are located within orbs called pearls which are inserted deep into the android heads, remarkably close to where we might find a pineal gland. The pearls can be programmed or reprogrammed remotely. The programming allows the Hosts to participate in the fantasy worlds of the theme parks by responding to the words and actions of the guests through scripts and AI improvisations. In Cartesian terms, the programming represents the essence of the mind, which is a nonphysical but identifiable as the “thing that thinks.”
Similar to the way Descartes imagined, the pearls animate the body, and once removed, the bodies are simply lifeless machines that appear to be human. In Cartesian language, they are vessels awaiting the pilot, and the pilot is the pearl. The “self” of the Host — the intelligence, personality, motions, and memories — are entirely contained within the pearl, and as we learn in season 3, the pearls can removed from one Host body and then transported and implanted within a new or different body.
Doubt, Descartes Style: Spoiler Warning
On Westworld, the ability of the pearls to be transferred from one android body to another raises the question about the nature of the self. In season 3, the Host called Dolores, now escaped from Westworld and living in the outside world, reveals that she has five pearls in her possession. Gradually, we learn that she has duplicated her own pearl and inserted it into other android bodies in addition to her own. For example, in season 2, Dolores kills the human character of Westworld corporate executive Charlotte Hale. But in season 3, Charlotte is back — or is she? The body looks like Charlotte, but we soon learn that the body is a synthetic replica, and the pearl within her is actually a pearl containing Dolores’ mind. So is Charlotte, Charlotte because she has a Charlotte body? Or is she Dolores? And if Charlotte is Dolores, who is Dolores?
That’s not the most complex question that Westworld asks. Throughout the series we experience uncertainty and the possibility of illusion. Descartes would be doubtful of it all.
[1] Rene Descartes, Meditations on a First Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane, Cambridge University Press, 1911. Orig. pub. 1641. 28.
[2] Descartes, 29.
[3] As quoted in Gert-Jan Lokhorst, “Descartes and the Pineal Gland”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/pineal-gland/.
[4] As quoted in Lokhorst.
